The paper reconstructs the argument of Benjamin's early Hölderlin essay, with special emphasis on the notion of das Gedichtete. This notion is shown to name a fundamental dissonance between two semiotic modalities, graphics and Gestalt.
BENJAMIN'S THEORY OF THE LYRIC
Subsequently we shall see that the concept "individual work" is a problematic one for Benjamin: that the work itself, thought of as a completely determinate individuality, is an "absolute," an Idee in the Kantian sense, and therefore inaccessible to analysis. For the present, however, it is useful to take the opposition "general regularities" vs. "individual works" unproblematically, and to ask: does this opposition specify commentary as a hermeneutic inquiry? Hermeneutics, after all, involves interpretive engagement with individual works. This is an important question to ask because the present climate of theoretical discussion is characterized, especially in Germany, by an expansive, colonizing use of the term hermeneutics. Indeed, a certain universality ( Universalitatsanspruch) has even been attributed to the term, an attribution which has successfully masked the contingency and limitations of hermeneutics as a discursive formation.' In view of this ideological expansionism, then, it is useful to stress the non-hermeneutic, the other-than-hermeneutic potential of the concept of commentary.' The first point to be made in this regard is that Benjamin never employs, throughout the text, the terms Verstehen or Interpretieren as designations of his own mode of inquiry. These terms, the leading ones of hermeneutics, designate mental or cognitive operations. As such-and in contrast to a term such as "commentary," which alludes to a tradition of textual practices-they set into motion that process of ideological universalization mentioned above which disavows the discursive specificity and positionality of the hermeneutic enterprise. But Of course, nothing is more common in literary theory than the appeal to the unity of form and content, an appeal often supported through reference to the authority of classical-romantic thought. The proof of Benjamin's theoretical stature will be the degree to which he is able to transcend this abstract claim and to think concretely the nature of this aesthetic unity. That such is indeed the case becomes clear as we move to the second conceptual take on das Gedichtete.
B. Praxis-oriented Definition. The central terms here are task and solution (or fulfillment), terms that are drawn from the sphere of what we might call practical doing, for it is activities-praxis-which have tasks that they either fulfill or do not. The term "task" (Aufgabe-that which is given up to the activity to be done) receives initial accentuation, but it must be emphasized that, even as das Gedichtete is the task of the poem. it is also its Erfullung. It is the sphere in which task and fulfillment are mediated and pass over into one another. What I think is at play in this aspect of Benjamin's definition is the Aristotelian concept of poeisis as an activity that has its end in itself. The task which poeisis fulfills is not, as in practical/purposive activity, extrinsic to the activity: it is not given in advance, but rather emerges only within the activity. The task is its own accomplishment. Hence, the task can only be derived, constructed, from the activity, in our case, the poem: "Nicht danach kann die Bewertung sich richten, wie der Dichter seine Aufgabe gelost habe, vielmehr bestimmt der Ernst und die GrOsse der Aufgabe selbst die Bewertung. Denn diese Aufgabe wird aus dem Gedichte selbst abgeleitet" ( II.
105).
C. Structural Definition. Das Gedichtete is thirdly defined as a particular type of structure, as the "unity" of two orders: It is "die geistig-anschauliche Struktur derjenigen Welt, von der das Gedicht zeugt" (II, 105): the "synthetische Einheit der geistigen und anschaulichen Ordnung" (II, 106). The structure in question, then, Ideen belong to the conditions of possibility of our knowing insofar as they anticipate the totality of the object in question; this unpresentable totality orients inquiry by, as it were, casting its light back onto the movement of the investigation. In Benjamin's view, the concept of das Gedichtete occupies a space defined by two such ideas: on the one hand, the poem itself (das Gedicht), in its full actuality, and on the other hand, "life" (das Leben). Das Gedichtete is the limit concept (Grenzbegriff) that marks the differentiation and articulation of these two spheres, which, as ideas, cannot themselves be given to a representation. Thus, far from being a positive, empirical entity, das
Gedichtete is a relational sphere, the site where Gedicht and Leben pass over into one another.
The task of the analysis, then, is to chart the differential move- sphere is characterized by "Vereinzelung der Gestalt" and "Beziehungslosigkeit des Geschehens" (II, 1 1 1 ) . This analysis then sets up a contrastive background against which the realization of das Gedichtete as "synthetische Einheit der anschaulichen and geistigen Ordnung" can be demonstrated with regard to the poem Blodigkeit. Only this second phase of Benjamin's reading will concern me here. The reading of Blodigkeit addresses itself to four thematic spheres (each marked off typographically by paragraph divisions): 1) the abstractly defined structural "identity" of orders in the text; 2) the order of the Lebendigen; 3) the order of the Goiter, 4) the nature of Mut or Blodigkeit. My procedure will be to consider in this section the first three phases of this reading together. In the subsequent secdon of my commentary I will compare the dynamics of Benjamin's argument with a semiotic problematic which Benjamin himself elaborated in a pair of theoretical fragments written some three years after the Holderlin essay. Via this detour through the philosophy of signification I hope to prepare an understanding of the final (4) turn of Benjamin's reading, the discussion of which will return us to the question of the "mythic."
The structural node which provides for Benjamin ' This schema can be considered as a conceptual map for the remainder of Benjamin's analysis, which undertakes to articulate the inner logic and movement of each of the terms arrayed here. In this way, the abstract character of the initial interpretive hypothesis is overcome in the specific dynamics of the reading.
The figuration of the anschauliche Ordnung in the order of the Lebendigen unfolds as a metaphorical spatialization: "Die Lebendigen sind, jeweils deutlich, in dieser Welt Holderlins, die Erstreckung des Raumes, der gebreitete Plan, in d e m . . . sich das Schicksal erstreckt" (II, 113). Decisive here is that the space of the "living" is not thought as volume, but rather as two-dimensional surface, as plane. And if, as Benjamin claims, both "living" and "gods" are only "Dimensionen" of das Gedichtete, then we can say that the first of these dimensions is a certain horizontality. The central point, however, is that this horizontality does not enter the text as indefinite and empty expanse, but rather as a surface articulated, inscribed with an order (and hence related by "identity" to a geistige sphere). This is the thought that Benjamin develops with regard to the powerful second line of Holderlin's text: "Geht auf Wahrem dein Fuss nicht, wie auf Teppichen?" The line specifies the poet's "acquaintance" with the "living" as a patterned movement across a surface. This "walking out" is the poet's destiny; its every step constitutes the true. In what is probably the boldest move of his entire reading, Benjamin concretizes this notion of pattern by interpreting the carpets as "oriental": the poet's steps trace out the windings of the carpets' ornamental design. The notion of ornament forms the crux of Benjamin's reading: in its peculiar logic of "Lage" (II, 1 1 4) , in which every point is at once determining of and determined by all others, the ornament-this asemantic inscription of a plane-realizes the Identitat der geistigen und anschaulichen Ordnung which is das Gedichtete.
Of course, the poetic task is not yet complete. The ornament figures, to be sure, the unity of orders, but does so only with regard to the "living," the dimension of horizontality. There remains another dimension to be considered, that of the gods, a dimension which is characterized by plasticity (or Gestalt) and temporality. This is the sphere where das Geistige reigns, just as the living represent the sphere of Anschaulichkeit. Thus, it is no accident that at every point where Benjamin explicates the spatial figuration of the "living" he hits upon a moment of plasticity and temporality that signals the intervention of the spiritual/intellectual within the sensate/intuitive. This is the case with all his local readings in this section of the essay: the reading of the ornamental carpet, of the notion of Gelegenheit, of the phrase "zur Freude gereimt." What marks these interventions is in every case a "Dissonanz": "Diese Dissonanzen heben im dichterischen Gefage die aller riumlichen Bestimmung einwohnende zeitliche Identitat und damit die absolut bestimmende Natur des geistigen Daseins innerhalb der identischen Erstreckung hervor" (II, 117). Dissonance-this differential strife-is the unity of the two "gegeneinanderstrebenden" orders within the order of Anschaulichkeit, the realization of das Gedichtete as absolute script. 
